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Learning from the Enemy ?
The Civilian Conservation Corps in a Transnational Perspective
Kiran Klaus Patel
1 The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was one of the institutions established in Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s first hundred days as President. Thus, it became part of the New Deal’s
alphabet  soup,  along  with  other  agencies  that  by  now  have  an  almost  mythical
connotation,  such as  the  National  Industrial  Recovery Administration,  the  Tennessee
Valley  Authority,  or  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Administration.  Together,  they
demonstrated that  Roosevelt’s  words « action and action now » of  his  first  inaugural
speech had not been an empty promise (Rosenman, 12).
2 Since the days of  the New Deal,  the CCC has attracted public  and scientific  interest.
However, so far it has only been researched as part of the New Deal experience and of
American history, but possible influences from abroad have not been considered. Thus,
the traditional interpretation of the « isolationist » character of America in the 1930’s is
being perpetuated by and large.
3 In this paper, a new perspective shall be added to the history of the Civilian Conservation
Corps.  Here,  the  organization is  being placed in  a  larger,  transnational  context  that
includes the study of international perceptions and transfers from or to other countries.
It  will  be  pointed  out  that  even  in  these  times  of  crisis  the  American  nation‑state
remained  to  be  a  « semipermeable  container,  washed  over  by  forces  originating  far
beyond its shores » (Rodgers, 1).
I.
4 On March 21st, 1933, less than three weeks after his inauguration, Roosevelt formally
asked Congress to select and organize 250,000 young, unemployed men and to put them
to work. The CCC was to help underprivileged American citizens between the age of 18
and 25 who were struck by the Great Depression economically and psychologically.1 It was
hoped that a combination of hard physical work in nature, vocational training, a broad
educational program, and a disciplined way of life far away from the urban centers would
improve the self‑confidence, physical shape, and employability of the young men (Patel
2003 ;  Stieglitz 1999 ;  Salmond  1967).  Ultimately,  the  enrollees  should  become
« law‑abiding, respectable, and useful citizens » (Brown 6). By establishing the Civilian
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Conservation Corps, the New Deal created a labor service :  an organization somewhat
similar to a public work scheme, but also including an explicit educational dimension. At
the same time, the CCC was instituted as a means to restore America’s depleted natural
resources. Roosevelt was much more aware of these environmental problems than many
of his contemporaries, and his initiative to build up the CCC must be understood in this
context.  In  general,  the  Civilian  Conservation Corps  was  meant  to  help  and educate
young,  unemployed  men  by  putting  them  to  work  at  projects  with  an  ecological
dimension (Patel 2003, 159‑188 ; Maher ; Stieglitz 1999, 9‑20). 
5 At the same time, the CCC demonstrated autonomous and « radical » state action—no
civilian program of this size had ever been attempted before in the United States. Soon,
many Americans considered this New Deal agency to be a great success.  In 1936,  for
example, the Republican presidential candidate Governor Alfred M. Landon specifically
endorsed the CCC and thus removed it from the arena of campaign criticism. Only in 1941,
when  mass  unemployment  decreased,  did  the  knell  of  the  CCC  sound.  Now,  young
Americans found positions on the regular job market and no longer needed the Corps.
After a turbulent debate in Congress, it was therefore given up in mid‑1942.
6 This story of the Civilian Conservation Corps has been told in many ways since the 1930’s.
Recollections  and  memoirs,  some  of  which  published  during  the  heyday  of  the
organization,  the  others  ever  since,  provide  precious  insights  into  the  life  of  CCC
enrollees (Brown ; Butler ; Hill ; Lacy). Besides, scientific research started soon after the
institution of the Corps. A small but steady stream of dissertations and other studies
began to flow in the 1930s (Aydelott ; Harper ; Scheibe ; Walker), widening in the early
1960s. At the same time, the first historical studies on the CCC were published (Johnson ;
Killigrew ;  Saalberg ;  Salmond  1967 ;  Woods).  An  outstanding  example  of  scholarship
stemming from the liberal tradition of New Deal historiography is John A. Salmond’s The
Civilian  Conservation  Corps,  1933‑1942 :  A  New Deal  Case  Study in  1967.  Salmond wrote  a
chronological narrative of the rise and fall of the agency, and even today his book is one
of the most important contributions to the history of the Corps. The study focuses on the
administrative  side  of  the  CCC from a  Washington perspective.  At  the  same time,  it
includes a vivid picture of everyday life in the camps. Although his overall picture of the
Corps  is  quite  sympathetic  and positive,  Salmond did  not  neglect  some of  the  more
problematic  sides  of  the  CCC.  Thus,  he  underlined  the  systematic  exclusion,
discrimination, and segregation of African‑Americans at least in some parts of the United
States.
7 Since then,  diverse studies  have deepened these insights  into the problems of  racial
discrimination in the Civilian Conservation Corps. Not only the policies leading to these
deficits  have  been  researched  but  also  have  the  perspective  on  African‑Americans
experiencing the Corps under these conditions. Other ethnic minorities and their position
in the CCC have also become the object of investigation, such as Mexican‑Americans or
Native Americans (Cole ; Gower ; Montoya ; Parman, Salmond 1965 ; Stieglitz 2001).
8 Building upon this strand of research, newer studies inspired by Michel Foucault’s work
have analyzed the social techniques of discipline and normalization as practices of the
American democracy and of the CCC specifically. In these studies, an even more critical
interpretation  of  the  Corps  prevails,  emphasizing  the  militaristic,  sexist,  and  racial
elements as well as the anti‑emancipatory impact on the consciousness of the enrollees.
Here, the history of the CCC is not seen as a success story that might serve as a positive
example  for  similar  institutions  today  (Gorham 1992 ;  Pandiani ;  Stieglitz  1999).  This
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interpretation can only be understood before the background of several studies on the
educational dimension of the Corps that had come to a different conclusion concerning
its pedagogical value. Especially the research from the 1950’s and 1960’s had considered
the Corps as a very positive example of federal involvement into education, and often
combined  this  interpretation  with  the  plea  for  a  « new  CCC »  (Eberly/Sherraden ;
Herlihy ; Putnam ; Sherraden). These voices were by no means unsuccessful, since several
initiatives—such  as  JFK’s  Peace  Corps,  LBJ’s  National  Job  Corps,  or  the  California
Conservation Corps—explicitly referred to FDR’s CCC.
9 Apart from these diverging interpretations of the educational side of the Corps, various
studies have focused on the practical work that the enrollees undertook, such as fire
fighting, forest planting, or road construction. While some historians concentrated on the
agencies that organized the work projects for the CCC boys, others have analyzed the
long‑time effects of these efforts. For example, Cornelius Maher has recently argued that
the Corps played an instrumental role in bridging the transition from Progressive Era
conservation to post‑World War II environmentalism (Maher ; Otis ; Paige ; Savage).
1 : CCC men at ﬁre ﬁghting (Federal Security Agency : 37)2
10 If many of the studies discussed so far share an institutional point of view from top down,
others have also taken the regional and local dimension into consideration. Thus, they
investigated  how  the  CCC  was  accepted,  modified,  or  even  resisted  by  groups  and
individuals all over the United States. Not all regions and states have been covered, of
course,  but the variety of roles that the Corps and its camps played according to its
specific regional or local setting has become clear (Hendrickson 1976 ; 1981 ; Lyons).
11 In total, the Civilian Conservation therefore cannot be described as a « well‑known but
little‑researched New Deal programme » (Gorham 1992 [2] : 229) any longer—substantial
research has been done in the last  decades.  However,  important elements have been
neglected so far. The history of the Corps was not only shaped by factors of American
history but also by factors beyond the American borders. The foreign experiences that
played the most important role in the history of the Corps came from Nazi Germany—a
country that stood for directly opposing political principles.
12 In spite of their dramatic political difference, there are some similarities between the
measures in the field of economic and social policies between New Deal America and Nazi
Germany (Garraty 1973 ;  1987).  One of them is that both societies counted on a labor
service as a major means to fight the Great Depression. Therefore, this article explores
the role that the German labor service played in the history of the CCC. 
13 These two institutions,  the Civilian Conservation Corps and the German Arbeitsdienst,
were the two largest labor services of the 1930’s worldwide. There also were similarities
in the field of their work projects and their institutional setup. Before this background,
the  German  counterpart  had  a  shaping  influence  on  the  history  of  the  CCC.  More
precisely, its perception of National Socialist politics impinged on New Deal social policy.
Certain  options  were  tabooed  in  America  as  they  were  stigmatized  as  « fascist »—
although this interpretation is quite disputable. Thus, the political scope of action was
substantially  narrowed.  In other  cases,  that  have been totally  neglected so far,  even
intercultural transfers from the Third Reich to the New Deal can be found that contradict
the predominant picture of the tremendous difference between the American democracy
and the German dictatorship of the 1930s.
II.
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14 In early March 1933, when Roosevelt was inaugurated President of the United States, the
Great Depression had reached its climax. Therefore, the new administration considered
bold  and  audacious  measures  necessary  in  order  to  fight  the  economic,  social,  and
cultural  crisis.  The  CCC  was  a  part  of  this  program,  and  it  was  a  hastily  designed
organization. On March 14, Roosevelt asked four of his cabinet members to plan such an
institution and, just one week later, he already sent a message to Congress demanding the
creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps. According to the bill, the President was to be
granted broad and only vaguely defined competences to build up the agency.
15 Due to the situation and the general atmosphere, most Americans supported the extreme
experiment.  Therefore,  only  a  few  members  of  Congress  were  against  the  bill.
Nevertheless, some influential voices criticized Roosevelt’s program. Labor, for example,
was strongly against the measure. The President of the American Federation of Labor,
William Green, denounced the bill :  « It smacks, as I  see it,  of Hitlerism, of a form of
sovietism » (Joint Hearings : 46). Green did not express his fears very precisely and, of
course, « Hitlerism » had not yet shown its full face in late March 1933, when Green made
his  statement.  Nevertheless,  his  anxieties  were  symptomatic  for those  parts  of  the
American political elite that feared the USA might go the same way as the Soviet Union or
fascist Germany and Italy. 
16 This criticism was given substance when it became clear that officers of the U.S. Army
would run the CCC camps and that the military in general would play a major role in the
Corps.  On the one hand, the Army’s involvement is understandable,  since the federal
government had few resources to establish an institution as large as the CCC. The intense
time pressure was another reason why the task of  creating the Corps could only be
managed by drawing on already existing organizations. In the « lean » American state of
the  early  New  Deal,  only  the  Army  had  the  institutional  resources—the  staff,  the
know‑how, and the material requirements—to organize and lead the camps in which the
men were to be housed. Other jobs were handed over to different federal institutions : for
example, the Secretary of Labor was responsible for recruiting the men. Robert Fechner,
as Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, was put in charge of a comparably small
head office, and his position was primarily that of a mediator. The fact that the Civilian
Conservation Corps was substantially shaped and influenced by the U.S. Army thus had
chiefly organizational reasons (Patel 2003, 159‑169).
17 On the other hand, this point proved to be crucial for the public debate over the CCC.
Even if  Green’s  anxieties  were  rather  vague,  he  and other  critics  could  point  to  an
immediate example of their worst case scenario : the development of the German labor
service after the Nazis’ seizure of power during the very weeks the United States was
launching the Civilian Conservation Corps.  As  mentioned before,  a  somewhat  similar
institution to the CCC existed in Germany. At the end of the Weimar Republic, in 1931, the
German government had established the Freiwillige Arbeitsdienst (Voluntary Labor Service
—VLS) primarily to fight mass unemployment. The VLS addressed young, unemployed
men, organized them in camps and put them to work in projects such as flood control,
soil conservation, or forest protection. At the same time, the German labor service had an
educational dimension, similar to the CCC. The young men, some of whom had never
worked at all,  were to be reintegrated into society. Besides, some protagonists of the
Weimar Republic labor service had much more far‑reaching goals than their American
counterparts.  For  them,  this  organization  was  meant  to  bridge  social,  religious,  and
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especially political tensions among the participants and, altogether, it was intended to
serve as the cradle for a new national identity. 
18 When the Nazis came to power in early 1933, they did not dissolve the VLS, but reshaped
it according to their ideology. From now on, it was called the « school of the nation ».
Reichsarbeitsführer Konstantin  Hierl,  who  lead  the  organization  from  1933  to  1945,
glorified it as prototype of the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft (Hierl : 380‑82). Besides
this propagandistic function, the Third Reich introduced pre‑military training into the
VLS and, in general, tried to turn the labor service into a paramilitary institution (Patel
2003, 51‑90). 
2 : Nazi Labor Service LeaderHierl (in the Front) with Hitler at the Party Rally 1936 (Gönner : 145)
19 Leading American newspapers reported on all these changes in Germany. For instance,
the New York Times wrote about all steps the regime undertook in order to force the VLS
into  line—just  as  it  informed  about  the  general  situation  in  Germany.3 Given  the
developments in Germany and the role of the army in the organization of the CCC, some
Americans feared that the Corps could also be turned into a paramilitary institution with
hundreds of thousands of young men as an unconstitutional army for a potential dictator.
At the same time, the accusation that Roosevelt on the whole was trying to get hold of
competences far beyond those legitimized by his presidency was not uncommon at the
beginning of the New Deal. Liberal publishers such as I. F. Stone, communist newspapers
like the Daily Worker, and economists like Robert F. Brady shared few opinions, but in the
days of the early New Deal they all feared that Roosevelt might lead the country into
fascism (Kennedy : 218‑247 ; Winkler).
3 : Drill at a Camp of the Nazi Labor Service (Gönner : 225)
20 The establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps was one of the important factors
nourishing these worries. Not only did organized labor hold these views with respect to
the Corps, but, for example, liberal journals such as The Nation or The New Republic as well.
Even after 1933, they argued that the involvement of the army could be the starting point
of a development toward fascism. The American socialists and communists were of the
same opinion. Similar criticism was voiced at the other end of the political spectrum by
conservative members of Congress, who opposed the quasi‑dictatorial powers given to
Roosevelt  in  order  to  establish the  Corps  (Swing ;  McKay 1934,  1935 ;  Salmond 1967,
114‑15).  Consequently,  as  early  as  spring 1933 the German labor  service  became the
deterrent embodiment of American anxieties about the CCC’s future.
21 Even if most of these fears were voiced at the fringes of the American political discussion,
Roosevelt took great pains to allay them. Beginning in 1933, the CCC and the President
himself reiterated that major differences separated the American labor service from its
German counterpart. Only this strategy of calming the anxieties made it possible for the
CCC bill to be passed by Congress in the last days of March 1933. Fechner and his staff
emphasized that there was no military training and no other kind of drill in the Corps. In
line with this stance, Roosevelt rejected all political attempts to introduce such a training.
When, for example, assistant secretary of war Harry Woodring suggested in January 1934
that  the  CCC  should  develop  a  more  military  character,  the  American  public  was
outraged. The White House dissociated itself from Woodring’s statement and forced him
to apologize publicly (Woodring ; Warren). All similar initiatives, often expressed by high
army officers,  were  also  not  successful.  At  the  same time,  the  American  public  and
especially the press kept a close watch on developments within the Corps. Every hint of
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military drill was harshly criticized as « fascist » or as a form of « Hitlerism » (Hagood).4
Thus, in the first years of the New Deal the perception of the Nazi labor service had a
major impact on the CCC. It was the polar opposite from which the Corps distanced itself.
Moreover,  the perception of  the Nazi  labor  service  narrowed the American scope of
action : Some options, such as the militarization of the CCC, were tabooed because they
allegedly resembled developments in Germany.
22 Despite  this  political  context,  the  CCC became one  of  the  most  successful  New Deal
agencies. Hundreds of thousands of young, poor Americans passed through its camps : by
1942 the total number stood at nearly 3 million men (Salmond 1967 : 221). The enrollees
of the Corps were given shelter,  food, work, and an educational program in order to
improve their chances for future employment. Vocational classes included, for example,
cooking,  clerical  work,  stone  masonry,  forestry,  and  road  building.  On  a  more
fundamental level, illiterates were being helped. In 1936, after three years of operation,
the Corps had taught more than 35,000 men to read and write. Enrollees with a high
standard of  education had the chance to complete their  high school  education or to
continue with college work in evening classes.  In addition,  the Corps offered classes
including arts and crafts, dramatics and music. At the same time, the practical work of
the Corps helped restore America’s depleted natural resources. A popular nickname for
the CCC was « Roosevelt’s Tree Army » : Planting trees was regarded as its primary field of
work. In fact, the CCC was responsible for more than half of all the forest planting ever
done in the history of the United States up to the 1940s. However, even more camps were
engaged  in  other  types  of  projects,  such  as  fire  fighting,  flood  control,  wildlife
restoration, or road construction. In the light of its accomplishments, it is not surprising
that the Corps was highly regarded by the American people. Surveys show that it was
among the most highly esteemed New Deal institutions. The CCC was not just Roosevelt’s
pet agency, but also something like the pet agency of the nation (Patel 2003 : 272‑296,
376‑398 ; Salmond 1967 : 102‑134‑29).
4 : The CCC at work (Federal Security Agency : 55)
III.
23 However, 1938 brought major changes for the Corps. America was now discussing the
questions of a future war and the country’s preparation for such a challenge. In this
context, the military potential of the CCC was seen in a new light, and the interpretation
of the National Socialist labor service changed dramatically. It was the President of the
United States of America himself who took an unconventional step. Roosevelt ordered a
lengthy report on the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD), as the Nazi labor service was called since
1935, from the U.S. embassy in Berlin—not to procure propaganda material against the
Third Reich, but as a source of information and inspiration. In Berlin, Henry P. Leverich,
was asked to prepare the report the president had requested. Leverich, Third Secretary of
the Embassy, had already written several shorter pieces on the RAD, and in order to carry
out this  new task,  he even worked in a Nazi  labor service camp for a few days.5 He
completed a substantial, 60‑page report in July 1938, and it landed on Roosevelt’s desk a
short time later. The analysis was based on a thorough, intensive research. The President
did not read the study himself, of course, but he was briefed in its major findings.6 It was
also circulated within the CCC and all related institutions.7 
24 In this case, no direct influence can be traced from the Nazi organization into the reform
process of the CCC. All the same, these developments show an unexpected willingness to
study the Third Reich as a source of policy ideas. They are even more remarkable if one
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considers the relationship between Germany and the United States in the years after 1933
when the New Deal  and especially the CCC endeavored to distance itself  as  much as
possible from all  totalitarian solutions including the Nazi labor service and the Third
Reich as a whole.
25 The American interest went even further in a different instance. At the end of 1938, the
administration  considered  introducing  air  mechanic  training  for  the  CCC  boys.  The
United States did not have enough of those sought‑after aviation specialists for a future
war. In August 1938, the assistant secretary of war, Louis Johnson, informed the President
that this lack of  experts was « one of  the most serious problems as regards national
defense. »  Johnson referred to  the  « notable  examples »  of  « England and Germany »
where some 15,000 to 20,000 boys were being trained.8 As part of this discussion, the U.S.
government analyzed the German RAD and other Nazi agencies. Especially the Flieger‑HJ, a
branch of the Nazi youth organization, was considered to be a relevant source. Finally,
classes for air mechanics were introduced into the CCC, and the Nazi experience
obviously had been a source of inspiration in the process.9 
26 Interestingly, there was no public resistance to this adoption even though the New York
Times reported about the American investigation into Nazi air mechanics training for the
CCC.10 Considering that American involvement in a war against Germany was becoming
increasingly  likely,  these  developments  are  quite  astonishing.  They  are  even  more
surprising  in  the  light  of  another  debate.  In  the  same year,  Roosevelt  was  attacked
severely due to his alleged consular ambitions. Many Americans, especially conservatives,
mistrusted the President’s  plans.  These suspicions culminated in the debate over the
reorganization bill in 1938—a proposal to empower the President to reshuffle agencies
and to concentrate competences in the hand of the Executive. In this case just as in the
discussions over the CCC, the perception of recent developments in Germany served as an
argument against the President and his policy. According to this interpretation of the
Nazis’  political  success,  dictatorships  arise  from a  steady  accretion  of  power  to  the
Executive. Representative Bert Lord of New York, for example, admonished : « Germany
once had a good government, but, little by little, they gave power and authority to their
President  […].  If  we pass  this  bill  [Roosevelt]  will  have powers  to  correspond to the
powers given to President Hindenburg. Hindenburg did not become a dictator, but Hitler
did. » (Quoted in Leuchtenburg : 278 ; Dickinson) In view of these political arguments, it is
even  more  astonishing  that  there  was  no  recognizable  public  indignation  when  the
Roosevelt‑Administration considered to copy initiatives from the Nazi dictatorship in the
field of vocational training.
5 : Vocational Training in the CCC (Federal Security Agency : 81)
27 But how should one interpret these new modes of perception and transfer between the
German  dictatorship  and  the  American  democracy ?  First,  the  analysis of  National
Socialist  practices  was  just  one  of  several  sources  that  fed  the  American  reform
discussion. Since experiences within the CCC and other American institutions were also
consulted, it is difficult to evaluate the exact role the German example played in the
process of American policy formulation.
28 Second, the United States did not copy the Nazi initiatives directly. On the contrary :
American officials emphasized the fundamental differences between their own political
goals and those of Nazi Germany. Roosevelt himself expressed this most clearly when he
thanked the American ambassador in Berlin, Hugh Wilson, for Leverich’s report on the
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RAD. In a letter dated 3 September 1938, the President pointed out : « All of this helps us
in planning,  even though our methods are  of  the democratic  variety ! »11 Indeed,  no
evidence can be found that the United States imitated German practices that had a strong
ideological dimension. The racial and highly aggressive policy of Nazi Germany did not
make its  way across the Atlantic.  However,  in politically more neutral  areas such as
vocational training the United States was interested in Germany’s experiences. All in all,
this reveals the degree to which America was part of international discussions and the
extent  of  its  willingness  to  learn  from  other  states—although  this  transnational
dimension is often overlooked in the American public and in American historiography.
29 Third,  these  transfers  show that  some  features  of  the  Nazi  regime  were  considered
worthy of being copied. The policies of the Third Reich did not seem totally irrational ; in
fact,  some  of  its  economic  or  social  programs  were  attractive  to  foreign  observers.
Considering their direct,  functional  goal,  some measures proved to be successful  and
usable. In their German context, they always served two major aims : preparation for a
military conflict and the conduct of war on the one hand, and the implementation of the
National Socialist racial ideology on the other hand. However, they could be disconnected
from this context and transferred to another society and its political culture. Then, they
could be filled with a new meaning. In this way it was possible to integrate them into the
democratic context of the New Deal successfully. 
30 In light of these observations, it is less remarkable that the intensive examination of the
Nazi labor service by American experts was not an exception. At the end of the 1930s, the
same experts scrutinized other institutions of the Third Reich, such as the recreational
organization Kraft  durch Freude or Nazi  public work schemes.  In some instances their
findings were also forwarded to the President of the United States, the idea being that
they could be used to help set the course for America’s own policies.12
IV.
31 The positive view of the RAD, however, only lasted for a short period of time. In 1940, the
CCC was opened to all young American men, even if it continued to recruit primarily
unemployed young men. The new impulse strengthened those who wanted to broaden
the educational dimension of the Corps. The driving force behind these efforts was Eugen
Rosenstock‑Huessy,  an  exile  from  Germany.  As  Professor  at  Dartmouth  College  in
Vermont and a former Professor at Harvard, he gathered a group of students and focused
their interest on a special project for the CCC. The students set up a camp in which new,
more experimental  educational  methods  were implemented.  These  were supposed to
change the CCC enrollees into more autonomous citizens. In general, the attempt was
inspired by a communitarism avant la lettre. 
32 This democratic experiment, however, became a target of growing public criticism. The
main accusation had to do with Rosenstock’s German origin. The outraged assault of the
press did not care to differentiate. It was correct that Rosenstock had been involved in
German labor service projects before he had emigrated to the United States.  But his
critics failed to note that the German professor had been persecuted by the Third Reich.
Instead, they turned him into a precursor of the Nazi labor service though his labor camp
initiative  in  the  Weimar  Republic  had  been  of  a  democratic,  communitarian  kind
(Rosenstock). The negative perception also prevailed in an investigation of the House of
Representatives established to research the Rosenstock issue. There, harsh criticism was
voiced against Rosenstock’s experiment « on the ground that it smacked of Germany’s
work camps. »13
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33 This  interpretation  of  Rosenstock’s  background  was  possible  only  because  little  was
known in the United States about his time in Germany and about the VLS in general. In
sharp contrast to the relevance of the Nazi institution to the American discussions, the
VLS was hardly ever publicly alluded to in America. Only some of the experts on CCC
education held a rather positive view of the VLS :  According to Kenneth Holland, the
author of several studies on education in the CCC, the VLS camps « would have prevented
a great many youth from becoming enthusiastic Nazis », had they « been developed on a
large  scale  by  the  government  at  a  much  earlier  date »  (Holland :  89‑90).14 But  this
interpretation found little resonance in the United States. Even Fechner, Roosevelt, and
the top echelons of the Corps were more ignorant than unfriendly to the VLS. As a result,
those who were highly critical of Rosenstock and the VLS were able to carry the day. The
experimental  camp  was  removed  from  the  control  of  Rosenstock  and  his  students.
Finally, it was dissolved at the end of 1941 (Patel 2003 : 175‑177 ; Preiss).
34 In general, the perception of the German labor service had come full circle : even more
than had been the case in the early days of the New Deal, all references to Germany were
seen as illegitimate,  even if  they drew on democratic initiatives such as Rosenstock’s
communitarian experiments. The astonishing openness that had marked the year 1938
had vanished. In the face of World War II, which America was about to enter, anything
that was or seemed to be German was unacceptable to the American public.
6 : CCC Camp (Federal Security Agency : 9)
35 The problems of  camp education and Rosenstock’s role were one factor why the CCC
weakened in 1941. Even more important for this development, however, was the decline
in unemployment due to the surging wartime economy. Young men were now able to find
regular jobs. Whereas the CCC had organized an annual average of some 300,000 men
between 1933 and the beginning of 1941, it only included 190,000 enrollees in mid‑1941.
Considering the economic situation, it was clear that the Civilian Conservation Corps was
no longer needed as a means to fight youth unemployment. As Rosenstock’s attempt to
convert the Corps into a pedagogic instrument had failed and as most Americans only
wanted the CCC to be an instrument of relief, it had become superfluous. Over Roosevelt’s
opposition, Congress abolished it in June 1942 (Patel 2003 : 168‑169).
V.
36 Important features of the history of the CCC can only be explained by considering the
American perception of its German counterparts, the VLS on the one hand and the Nazi
Reichsarbeitsdienst on the other hand. 
37 A negative image of the Nazi institution shaped the CCC right from the beginning. Certain
options,  such  as  the  militarization  of  the  Corps  were  denounced  as  « fascist »  and
therefore  not  pursued  for  a  long  time—even  though  a  militarized  CCC  would  not
necessarily have had a fascist or a totalitarian character. Embedded within the pluralistic
and democratic political culture of New Deal America, it could have served military goals
without militarizing or terrorizing society. However, the political atmosphere of the early
New Deal  society made it  impossible  even to discuss  the options  of  military drill  or
training publicly. This demonstrates how much the American image of the German labor
service shaped the scope of New Deal policy—the power of perception proves to be a
major political factor. 
38 The  primary  reason  behind  the  change  that  occurred  in  1938  in  the  way  the
Reichsarbeitsdienst was perceived was the astonishing openness of the President of the
Learning from the Enemy ?
Transatlantica, 1 | 2006
9
United States himself. There had been reports on the RAD before, but it was only due to
the personal interest of Roosevelt that these sources were treated as precious pieces of
information in the reorientation process of the Civilian Conservation Corps. In 1938, no
public outcry followed when the federal administration publicly discussed adopting Nazi
measures, and when some elements were in fact integrated into the CCC. This would have
been unthinkable in 1941. Now, a distorted picture of the German exile Eugen Rosenstock
hindered a reform discussion that might have given the organization a new meaning. In
times  of  rapidly  declining  unemployment,  only  a  major  restructuring  process  and
especially  a  broader  educational  target  could  have  provided  the  Corps  with  a  new
legitimacy. However, similar to the early New Deal years, a negative view of the German
labor  service  had  severely  limited  the  scope  of  discussion  in  the  US.  Thus,  these
perceptions had a major impact on the history of the CCC between 1933 and 1942.
39 All  in  all,  this  leads  to  three  conclusions.  First,  the  CCC  like  many  other  modern
institutions was shaped by lessons learned from or in other countries. Germany was an
important reference in this case. Over a long period the Corps distinguished itself from
seemingly similar Nazi initiatives. It might not seem surprising that Americans for a long
time  strongly  opposed  all  features  that  resembled  Hitler’s  labor  service.  In  some
instances, however, the anxieties seem exaggerated from today’s perspective, even if they
can be explained by the extreme challenges all democracies were facing in confrontation
to the two big political alternatives of the 20th century, fascism and communism. At the
same  time,  the  question  arises  whether  these  critics  also  used  the  accusation  of
resembling German measures solely as an argument to fight programs they opposed for
other reasons. 
40 Even more astonishing than the attempts to delimit American policy from Nazi initiatives
are the intense analyses and the transfers from Nazi Germany to the United States at the
end of the 1930s. Every explanation of this openness has to remain hypothetical to some
extent. Obviously, Roosevelt’s personal interest played a major role in this process, as did
the crisis that the Corps found itself in at the time. Probably, the non‑existence of an
extreme right wing faction broadened Roosevelt’s scope of action, too : Since there was
no rightist or fascist organization of any influence in America, and since no organization
advocated copying the Nazi institution in the United States, it was less problematic for a
democratic politician to show interest in the German model. These factors made possible
a discourse that was less burdened by taboos and considerations of political correctness.
41 Second, this points to a general phenomenon : Societies not only cooperate and compete
politically,  economically,  and culturally.  Also,  their  elites  observe each other.  This  is
especially true for modern societies. Sometimes, states and other entities try to distance
themselves from seemingly similar developments, and the perceived objects thus become
important factors in discourses. In other cases, political elites are ready to learn from
their objects of observation, and sometimes they go so far as to follow Ovid’s famous
saying in his Metamorphoses : « It’s proper to learn even from an enemy. »
42 Third, the analysis of these perceptions and transfers has methodological implications,
too. Only by investigating potential influences of similar organizations within the same
national context and abroad, a full picture of an institution or of a historical development
can  be  gained.  In  the  last  few years,  some  studies—such  as Daniel  Rodger’s  Atlantic
Crossing—have  shown  how  fruitful  these  new  approaches  beyond  a  nation‑centered
historiography can be (Rodgers).15 This  article has argued that  the perception of  the
German labor  services  left deep  imprints  on  its  American  counterpart.  However,  all
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existing studies on the CCC overlooked this transnational, transatlantic dimension and
thus ignored one crucial factor in the development of the Corps. Therefore, recent calls to
internationalize American History and to situate American national history more fully
into  its  larger  transnational  and intercultural  global  context  can only  be  underlined
(Patel  [2] ;  2004 ;  Bender).  It  is  not  always  necessary  to  abandon  the  perspective  of
national  history.  Placing  American  history  in  an  international  framework  and  thus
understanding American history better can also be a plea for a comparative history that
includes  the  examination  of  perceptions  and  transfers  between  national  entities.
Especially for the history of the 19th and 20th century, for which the concept of nation
played such a predominant role, these approaches seem to be most promising.
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NOTES
1. In later years, these provisions concerning the age were altered several times. Most of
the time, however, the CCC was open to men between 18 and 25.
2. For pictures of the CCC, also see http://newdeal.feri.org/
3. E.g. « Young Nazis Hail Labor Service Plan, » NYT, 17 June 1933 ; « Labor Conscription
Less Likely in Reich, » NYT 17 November 1933 ; « Labor Service to Prepare German Youths
[sic !] for Army, » NYT, 29 March 1935 ; « Nazi Organ Prints Attacks on France, » Chicago
Tribune, 18 February 1933. Also see Hönicke. 
4. For reactions, see National Archives and Record Administration/Hyde Park (NARA/HP),
Official Files (OF) 268, Box 2, McKinney to Early, 7 March 1934. Other example: ibd., Box 4,
Moseley to Early, 15 September 1936 ; « General Proposes CCC For All of 18, » NYT, 13
September 1936 ; « CCC Assailed By War Foe, » NYT, 15 September 1936 ; « Plan for C.C.C.
Drill Rejected at White House, » New York Herald Tribune, 15 September 1936 ; « Subversive
Forces, » Washington Post, 13 September 1936 ; « Oppose Military CCC, » Topeka Daily Capital
, 24 Sepember 1937.
5. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PA/B), R 47647, Hierl to Reichs
Ministry of the Interior, 25 April 1938 ; for Leverich’s earlier reports see NARA/HP,
Record Group (RG) 59/862.504/447, Report Leverich, 3 June 1935 ; ibd., 862.504/451,
Report Leverich, 8 June 1935 ; ibd., 862.504/452, Report Leverich, 17 June 1935.
6. National Archives and Record Administration, College Park (NARA/CP), RG
59/862.504/545, Wilson to Secretary of State, 29 July 1938 ; NARA/HP, OF 58B, Box 4,
Welles to FDR, 22 December 22 1938 ; NARA/HP, President’s Private Files (PPF), Box 32,
FDR to Wilson, 3 September 1938.
7.E.g. NARA/HP, Taussig Papers, Box 3, Confidential Remarks, 1938 ; NARA/CP, RG 35.2,
Box 770, Fechner to U.S. Veterans Administration, 14 January 1939.
8. NARA/HP, OF 58B, Box 4, Johnson to FDR, 12 August 1938.
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9. Ibd., Memo Hopkins, 15 August 1938 ; ibd., NARA/CP, RG 407, Box 47, Fechner to
Adjutant General, 23 May 1939.
10. E.g. « CCC Men for Air Pilots », NYT, 28 August 1939 ; Krock.
11. NARA/HP, President’s Secretary Files (PSF), Box 32, FDR to Wilson, 3 September 1938.
12. NARA/HP, PSF, Box 157, Delano to FDR, 18 November 1940 ; ibd., PSF, Box 32, Wilson
to FDR, 11 August 1938. Some of these documents have now become available on: http://
www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu.
13. « Sharon, Vt. Camp under Quiet Study, » Boston Herald, 6 February 1941, also see
« Pioneer CCC Plan Pushed in Vermont, » NYT, 2 February 1941 ; « CCC Camp again
Assailed, » Boston Herald 12 February 1941 ; « Attacks on the CCC, » Arkansas Democrat, 13
February 1941 ; « More about the Sharon CCC », Milwaukee Journal, 14 February 1941 ;
Barkley.
14. Holland had visited German VLS camps in 1932. However, Holland’s interpretation of
the VLS is quite questionable—only some of the initiatives within the VLS, such as
Rosenstock’s, had such a positive potential. 
15. Yet Rodgers discusses the borrowings of social politics from Europe by the United
States from 1870 to 1945 without analyzing the transfers from the Third Reich.
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